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TORT AND PROPERTY LAW-THE MASSACHUSETTS SUPREME 
JUDICIAL COURT SOUNDS THE DEATH KNELL FOR SECTION 14--Si­
mon v. Solomon, 385 Mass. 91, 431 N.E.2d 556 (1982). 
1. INTRODUCTION 
An issue recently presented to the Massachusetts Supreme Judi­
cial Court was whether a landlord could be held liable for a tenant's 
emotional distress. This issue arose in Simon v. Solomon, I along 
with questions involving warranty of habitability, the covenant of 
quiet enjoyment,2 and Chapter 186, Section 14 of the Massachusetts 
General Laws.3 
Celeste Solomon was a tenant in a federally subsidized base­
ment apartment, managed by Gem Realty Company (Gem).4 On 
thirty separate occasions, between April 1974 and November 1976, 
raw sewage and water ran into her apartment, covering the floors of 
the livingroom, bedroom and hallway.s With flooding ankle deep, 
Ms. Solomon testified that she sometimes left her bed at night to 
check on her young children only to step into cold sewage and 
water.6 On each occasion, Ms. Solomon would spend the rest of the 
night awake, waiting to call Gem so that workers would come to 
pump out the apartment.? Although Ms. Solomon suffered no actual 
physical injury, she became withdrawn, depressed, and unable to 
care for her children.8 Because of the persistent flooding of the 
apartment, Ms. Solomon sent her children to live with relatives and 
claimed that she spent much of her time in her bedroom crying, 
1. 385 Mass. 91, 431 N.E.2d 556 (1982). 
2. /d. at 93, 431 N.E.2d at 560. 
3. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 186, § 14 (West 1977 & Supp. 1983). Section 14 
supplies remedies for tenants against landlords who fail to provide safe and sanitary 
housing. Id. For a discussion of section 14, see infra notes 52-67 and accompanying text. 
4. 385 Mass. at 93, 431 N.E.2d at 560. Gem was controlled by Maurice Simon, the 
original plaintiff, now deceased. Id. at n.l, 431 N.E.2d at 560 n.!. The rent was $313 per 
month and Ms. Solomon paid $73 under the subsidy program. Id. at 1I0 n.l3, 431 
N.E.2d at 569 n.l3. 
5. Brief for Appellee at 3-4, Simon v. Solomon, 385 Mass. 91, 431 N.E.2d 556 
(1982). 
6. Id. at 4. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. at 16. 
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shunning the outside world.9 
As a result of these conditions, Ms. Solomon stopped paying 
rent in November 1976 and, within one month, Gem instituted sum­
mary eviction proceedings. 10 Ms. Solomon counterclaimed that Gem 
had negligently failed to maintain the apartment and breached its 
implied warranty of habitability and implied covenant of quiet en­
joyment, thereby causing Ms. Solomon to suffer emotional distress. I I 
Additionally, she claimed that Gem inflicted this emotional distress 
either intentionally or recklessly.12 
In a jury trial before the Housing Court, City of Boston, sum­
mary judgment was granted to the landlord regarding the claim of 
negligent maintenance. 13 The jury, however, found Gem liable on 
the remaining counts and assessed damages of $1000 for the breach 
of warranty of habitability, $10,000 for breach of quiet enjoyment, 
and $35,000 for intentional or reckless infliction of emotional dis­
tress. 14 In addition, Ms. Solomon was awarded $40,000 in attorney 
fees pursuant to section 14.15 
Gem appealed and the supreme judicial court affirmed the sum­
mary judgment on the negligence claim as well as the damage 
awards for emotional distress, breach of implied warranty of habita­
bility, and attorney fees. 16 The jury award of damages in the amount 
of $10,000 for the breach of implied covenant of quiet enjoyment 
was vacated on the basis that it was redundant. 17 
This note will trace the development of the warranty of habita­
bility and discuss the history of the tort claim of emotional distress in 
Massachusetts landlord-tenant law. The purpose and provisions of 
section 14, designed to provide safe and sanitary housing, will then 
be discussed and the Simon court's application of section 14 will be 
evaluated. Additionally, the rejection of the claim for negligent in­
fliction of emotional distress will be considered as well as the Simon 
court's refusal to hold Gem strictly liable for its breach of the war­
ranty of habitability. 
9. /d. at 17. 
10. 385 Mass. at 93, 431 N.E.2d at 560. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. at 94, 431 N.E.2d at 560. 
14. Id. at 94, 431 N.E.2d at 560-6l. 
15. Id. at 94, 431 N.E.2d at 561; see MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 186, § 14 (West 
1977 & Supp. 1983). 
16. 385 Mass. at 95, 431 N.E.2d at 56l. 
17. /d. at lI1, 431 N.E.2d at 569-70. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. Landlord-Tenant Law in Massachusetts 
Landlord-tenant law l8 has changed substantially from the dra­
conian principle that in the lease of a building as a dwelling, there 
was no covenant implied that the building was fit for habitation. 19 
At common law,20 a tenant was required to pay rent, even if the 
premises were destroyed, because the land underneath the premises 
was considered the primary aspect of the lease.21 As a result of this 
very strict rule and its harsh results, the doctrine of constructive evic­
tion evolved.22 This doctrine "relieved the tenant of his rent obliga­
tion if he could show that he had vacated the premises due to a 
severe failure of maintenance services amounting to a breach of the 
landlord's duty to assure quiet possession."23 The doctrine of con­
structive eviction, however, did not help a tenant who desired a hab­
itable dwelling. Thus, another exception was carved out of the 
common law rule: If the tenant's clear purpose was to obtain habita­
ble housing, then the independent covenants rule did not apply.24 
The independent covenants rule meant that the tenant's promise to 
pay rent was made independently of the landlord's promise to keep 
the dwelling habitable; this rule, therefore, prohibited a tenant from 
18. See generally, Comment, 20 ANN. SURV. OF MASS. LAW 18 (1973). 
19. See, e.g., Royce v. Guggenheim, 106 Mass. 201, 202-03 (1870). This presump­
tion was based on the theory that a lease was only a conveyance of real estate and that 
the primary purpose of the lease was to have possession of the land and not the building. 
Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 188-89,293 N.E.2d 831, 837 (1973). 
20. The Hemingway court stated the following as a summary of the common law: 
"There is no implied agreement, apart from fraud, that the demised premises are or will 
continue to be fit for occupancy or safe and in good repair. The tenant takes the premises 
as he finds them and there is no obligation on the landlord to make repairs." Boston 
Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 187-88,293 N.E.2d 831, 836 (1973) (quoting 
Fiomtino v. Mason, 233 Mass. 451,452, 124 N.E. 283, 283 (1919». 
21. See generally, Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 188-89,293 
N.E.2d 831, 837 (1973); Fiomtino v. Mason, 233 Mass. 451, 452, 124 N.E. 283, 284 
(1919); Royce v. Guggenheim, 106 Mass. 201, 202-03 (1870); Comment, supra note 18, at 
25-26. 
22. Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 189,293 N.E.2d 831, 837 
(1973). 
23. Id. at 189, 293 N.E.2d at 837 (quoting Note, Judicial Expansion of Tenants' 
Private Law Rights: Implied Warranties ofHabitability and Safety in Residential Urban 
Leases, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 489, 491 (1971». Constructive eviction created the fiction 
that the tenant had been evicted because his possessory interest in the property had been 
ruined by the landlord. The tenant was required to vacate after ascertaining that the 
conditions constituted a breach by the landlord. 363 Mass. at 190, 293 N.E.2d at 838. 
24. Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 190, 293 N.E.2d 831, 838 
(1973). 
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withholding rent on the basis that the landlord had breached some 
obligation. 
It was the early rule of Ingalls v. Hobbs,25 that held the in­
dependent covenants rule did not apply in a short term lease of a 
furnished house as "[i]ts fitness for a particular use ... [was] a far 
more important element [in] entering into the contract than when 
there [was] a mere lease ofreal estate."26 The court believed the pur­
pose of the tenant's leasing was well understood to be for use as 
habitation.27 The limited holding of Ingalls prevailed28 until 1973 
when the court, in Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway,29 held 
that the Ingalls exception to the common law rule "must now be­
come the rule in an urban industrial society where the essential ob­
jective of the leasing transaction is to provide a dwelling suitable for 
habitation."30 In addition to holding that the rental of any dwelling 
25. 156 Mass. 348, 31 N.E. 286 (1892). 
26. Id. at 350, 31 N.E. at 286. This holding was limited to the special facts of the 
short term lease for a furnished room or house. Additionally, the ruling showed a will­
ingness by the court to apply the standard of warranty of habitability when it was obvi­
ous that the contract was a promise by the landlord to "deliver premises suitable to the 
tenant's purpose in return for the tenant's promise to pay rent." Boston Hous. Auth. v. 
Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 191, 293 N.E.2d 831, 838 (1973). 
27. Ingalls, 156 Mass. at 350, 31 N .E. at 286. 
28. In Charles E. Burt, Inc. v. Seven Grand Corp., 340 Mass. 124, 129, 163 N.E.2d 
4, 7 (1959), the court recognized that a tenant was entitled to damages when a breach of 
quiet enjoyment went "to the essence" of the contract even though the tenant had not 
abandoned the premises. The court stated: 
[s]uch relief is more nearly adequate than the incomplete and hazardous rem­
edy at law which requires that the lessee (a) determine at its peril that the cir­
cumstances amount to a constructive eviction, and (b) vacate the demised 
premises, possibly at some expense, while remaining subject to the risk that a 
court may decide that the lessor's breaches do not go to the essence of the les­
sor's obligation. 
/d. at 129-30, 163 N.E.2d at 7. 
29. 363 Mass. 184,293 N.E.2d 831 (1973). 
30. Id. at 196-97,293 N.E.2d at 841. The court noted that the urban tenant had no 
concern over the land or property interest, but rather, was concerned with the premises. 
Id. In addition, the court relied on the rationale advanced in lavins v. First Nat'l Realty 
Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1078-79 (2d Cir. 1970). The Hemingway court stated that the ten­
ant is no longer a "jack-of-all-trades" like the agrarian farmer and the length of the 
tenancy may not justify requiring the tenant to undertake repairs. Further, the court 
expressed concern over the complexity of homes and stated that repairs are often expen­
sive and difficult, and many times the object in need of repair is totally within the control 
of the landlord. Hemingway, 363 Mass. at 197-98, 293 N.E.2d at 841-42 (citing Javins, 
428 F.2d at 1078-79). The court further stated that the holdings in Ingalls and Charles E. 
Burt, Inc. v. Seven Grand Corp., 340 Mass. 124, 163 N.E.2d 4 (1959); see supra note 8, as 
well as legislation establishing minimum sanitary requirements and the statutes devel­
oped to enforce those standards, showed a retreat from the "fundamental common law 
assumption on which the independent covenants rule [was] based ...." 363 Mass. at 
194, 293 N.E.2d at 840. In further justification for the change from common law, the 
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had an implied warranty of habitability that the premises were suita­
ble for habitation, the court stated further that a warranty, to the 
extent that it was based on state sanitary codes and local health regu­
lations, could not be waived by any provision of a rental agree­
ment.31 After these decisions, the court was then faced with 
delineating the scope of this warranty. 
Within a year after Hemingway, the court made clear in 
DiMarzo v. S & P Realty COrp.,32 that Hemingway did not apply to 
situations involving the tort liability of a landlord.33 When faced 
with this same issue in Crowell v. McCaffrey 34 five years later, how­
ever, the court held that the "extension of the warranty [of habitabil­
ity] to the ordinary residential tenancy at will, in accordance with the 
Hemingway decision, logically carries with it liability for personal 
injuries caused by a breach."35 There have been no major changes 
from this position in landlord-tenant law in Massachusetts. 
court stated "[t)he task of modifying the existing body oflaw to fit the structural changes 
(statutes and legislation) must of necessity be left [to) the courts with the hope that given 
an end, they will mould (sic) substantive doctrine to make it effective." Id. at 195,293 
N.E.2d at 841 (quoting Landis, Statutes and the Sources ofLaw, HARV. LEGAL ESSAYS 
(1934». 
31. 363 Mass. at 199,293 N.E.2d at 843. The court also stated that conditions not 
covered by the Sanitary Code might also be a breach of the warranty of habitability and 
that "fitness for human habitation" was not necessarily limited to minimum Code stan­
dards. Id. at 200-01 n.16, 293 N.E.2d at 844 n.16. The court did set forth several factors 
that were to be considered in determining whether there had been a breach of the im­
plied warranty of habitability: 
(a) the seriousness of the claimed defects and their effect on the dwelling's 
habitability; 
(b) the length of time the defects persist; 
(c) whether the landlord or his agent received written or oral notice of the 
defects; 
(d) the possibility that the residence could be made habitable within a reason­
able time; and 
(e) whether the defects resulted from abnormal conduct or use by the tenant. 
Id. at 200, 293 N.E.2d at 843-44 (footnotes omitted). 
32. 364 Mass. 510,306 N.E.2d 432 (1974). 
33. Id. at 514, 306 N.E.2d at 434. The court noted that the justification for the 
change in landlord-tenant contract rules was the uncertain validity of the common law 
stance that a lease was a conveyance of real estate. Id. (citing Boston Hous. Auth. v. 
Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973». The court also stated that 
"[w)hatever the contractual liability, there could be no tort liability for non-feasance in 
the absence of an agreement, for consideration, that the landlord would keep the prem­
ises in a condition of safety, and make all repairs without notice." 364 Mass. at 513, 306 
N.E.2d at 434. 
34. 377 Mass. 443, 386 N.E.2d 1256 (1979). 
35. 377 Mass. at 451,386 N.E.2d at 1261; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
PROPERTY § 17 Reporter's note to Introductory note to ch. 17 (1977). 
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B. Emotional Distress and Tort Law in Massachusetts 
In 1897, it was stated, in Spade v. Lynn & Boston Railway Co .,36 
that "in an action to recover damages for an injury sustained 
through the negligence of another there can be no recovery for bod­
ily injury caused by ... fright and mental disturbance."37 The 
court, however, left open the question of whether mental suffering 
that was caused intentionally or recklessly with "utter indifference" 
was actionable.38 This question was left unanswered for seventy­
four years.39 
The element of speculative damages has been a great concern of 
courts and the denial of infliction of emotional distress as an in­
dependent tort has been based upon a fear of fraudulent or frivolous 
claims,40 a concern over the difficulty in proof of causation,41 and a 
possible flood of litigation.42 But, recovery was granted as courts 
began to recognize the severe injury incurred by plaintiffs. Instead 
of basing the recovery on emotional distress, however, relief was 
based upon theories of false imprisonment, trespass, nuisance, inva­
sion of privacy, and technical assault.43 
36. 368 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897). 

37. Id. at 285, 47 N.E. at 88. Justice Allen further stated: 

we remain satisfied with the rule that there can be no recovery for fright, terror, 

alarm, anxiety, or distress of mind, if these are unaccompanied by some physi­

cal injury; and if this rule is to stand, we think it should also be held that there 

can be no recovery for such physical injuries as may be caused solely by such 

mental disturbance, where there is no injury to the person . . . without. 
Id. at 290, 47 N.E. at 89. This language exemplifies what is referred to as the "impact 
requirement", which Justice Holmes viewed as "an arbitrary exception, based upon a 
notion of what is practicable [and this] prevents a recovery for visible [injury] resulting 
from nervous shock alone." Homans v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 180 Mass. 456, 457, 62 
N.E. 737, 737 (1902). 
38. See Homans v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 180 Mass. 456, 456, 62 N.E. 737, 737 
(1902), where Justice Holmes discussed the Spade decision. 
39. See infra notes 44-45 and accompanying text. 
40. Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 170,472 P.2d 509, 519 (1970); Hatfield v. 
Max Rouse & Sons Northwest, 100 Idaho 840, 849, 606 P.2d 944, 953 (1980); Harrison v. 
Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co., 379 Mass. 212, 217, 396 N.E.2d 987, 990 (1979); Dziokon­
ski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 559, 380 N.E.2d 1295, 1299 (1978); Samms v. Eccles, II 
Utah 2d 289, 291, 358 P.2d 344, 345 (1961); W. PROSSER, THE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW 
OF TORTS, § 54, at 329 (4th ed. 1971); Hochman, "Outrageousness" and Privilege in the 
Law 0/Emotional Distress-A Suggestion, 47 CORNELL L. Q. 61, 61 (1961). 
41. See Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 563, 380 N.E.2d 1295, 1299 (1978); 
Samms v. Eccles, II Utah 2d 289, 291, 358 P.2d 344, 345 (1961). 
42. See W. PROSSER, supra note 36, at § 50. "[E]ven at the expense of a 'flood of 
litigation' . . . it is a pitiful confession of incompetence on the part of any court of a 
jurisdiction to deny relief on such grounds." Id. 
43. Prosser,Insult and Outrage, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 40, 42-43 (1956). See Interstate 
Life & Accident Co. v. Brewer, 56 Ga. App. 599, 193 S.E. 458 (1937) (technical battery 
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Finally, in George v. Jordon Marsh Co .,44 the court recognized 
emotional distress as an independent tort and held that "one, who, 
without privilege to do so, by extreme and outrageous conduct, in­
tentionally causes severe emotional distress and bodily harm even 
though he has committed no heretofore recognized common law 
tort" may be held liable.45 The court noted that the element of spec­
ulation was not any greater than in the usual tort claim where evi­
dence was offered and the issue of causation was required to be 
weighed with great care.46 The George court, however, declined to 
rule as to whether conduct that was negligent, grossly negligent, or 
wanton and reckless, that caused severe emotional distress and also 
resulted in bodily injury, was legally sufficient to state a cause of 
action. The court left open the question of the legal sufficiencies of 
such distress unaccompanied by bodily harm.47 
The question of whether a claim for emotional distress could be 
supported without accompanying physical injury arose in the lead­
ing case ofAgis v. Howard Johnson CO.48 The court inAgis held that 
a plaintiff could recover for emotional distress inflicted intentionally 
or recklessly even though there might not be accompanying bodily 
injury.49 The court listed the specific factors that a plaintiff would be 
found after insurance claims adjuster tossed a coin on bed of a woman suffering heart 
condition; because battery had been found, the woman was allowed to recover for dis­
tress caused by other attempts by adjuster to scare her with accusations of fraud and 
goldbricking); Boyce v. Greeley Square Hotel Co., 228 N.Y. \06, 126 N.E. 647 (1920) 
(emotional distress recovery allowed because trespass found where hotel employee went 
into hotel room and accused married couple of immoral conduct); see also Samms v. 
Eccles, II Utah 2d 289, 291, 358 P.2d 344, 345 (1961) ("[A] realistic analysis ... will 
show that the recognized tort is but incidental and that the real basis of recovery is the 
outraged feelings and emotional distress resulting from some aggravated conduct of the 
defendant."); M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 268 Ark. 269, 278, 596 S.W.2d 681, 686 (1980) 
(court admitted giving emotional distress damages when that was the only substantive 
damage suffered but attempted to find another tort on which to hang its hat). 
44. 359 Mass. 244,268 N.E.2d 915 (1971). 
45. Id. at 255, 268 N.E.2d at 921. In justifying its position the court stated: 
The right to recover. . . damages should not be denied just because they do not 
fit in any of the existing niches in the ancient walls surrounding the law of torts. 
If the current needs of society require and justify so doing, the walls may be 
extended and additional niches built to accomplish justice. 
Id. at 250, 268 N.E.2d at 918. 
46. Id. at 251,268 N.E.2d at 919 (quoting Torigian v. Watertown News Co., 352 
Mass. 446, 448-49, 225 N.E.2d 926, 927 (1967». 
47. 359 Mass. at 255, 268 N.E.2d at 921. 
48. 371 Mass. 140,355 N.E.2d 315 (1976). 
49. Id. at 141, 355 N.E.2d at 317. In this case the plaintiff, a waitress, was sum­
moned to a meeting along with all the other waitresses. At the meeting the defendant 
manager of the corporation informed the waitresses that stealing was occurring and that 
they did not know who was responsible. The manager continued by stating that until the 
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required to prove,50 and stated that if each of these factors were 
proven, the chances of frivolous or fraudulent claims would be 
minimized.51 
The tort claim of emotional distress has changed significantly 
since the restrictive stance of Spade. George and Agis demonstrate 
the court's willingness to consider the expansion of this claim. The 
evolution has been laborious, however, indicating that future expan­
sion promises to be similar. 
C. The Statute 
Section 1452 is part of a statutory scheme that supplies remedies 
for tenants as against landlords who fail to provide safe and sanitary 
housing.53 The purpose of the section is "to facilitate enforcement of 
State housing regulations and to provide relief for tenants deprived 
of decent homes."54 Specifically, a landlord who is required by any 
implied or express provision of the lease or contract to supply certain 
services,55 may not willfully or intentionally interfere with the fur­
nishing of that service either by direct or indirect means.56 Land­
lords are also proscribed from interfering in any way with the 
tenant's quiet enjoyment.57 While section 14 provides for criminal 
person was caught, he would begin to fire all the waitresses in alphabetical order. The 
plaintiff was promptly fired. /d. 
50. The Agis court established four elements that a plaintiff must show before re­
covery may be had: 
(I) that the actor [defendantI intended to inflict emotional distress or that he 
knew or should have known that emotional distress was the likely result of his 
conduct; ... (2) that the conduct was "extreme and outrageous" ...; (3) that 
the actions of the defendant were the cause of the plaintiffs distress . . .; and 
(4) that the emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff was "severe" .... 
/d. at 144-45,355 N.E.2d at 318-19 (citations omitted). 
51. Id. at 145, 355 N.E.2d at 319. The court stated" '[ilt is for the jury, subject to 
the control of the Court,' to determine whether there should be liability ...." Id. (quot­
ing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 46 comment h (1965». The standards ofAgis 
were applied in the Simon case. See supra note 50 and infra note 68 and accompanying 
text. 
52. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 186, § 14 (West 1977 & Supp. 1983); see supra note 
3. 
53. 385 Mass. at 100, 431 N.E.2d at 564. 
54. Id. at 101,431 N.E.2d at 564 (citing Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 
Mass. 184,293 N.E.2d 831 (1973». 
55. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 186, § 14 (West 1977 & Supp. 1983). The services 
enumerated are water, hot water, heat, light, power, gas, elevator service, telephone serv­
ice, janitor service and refrigeration service. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
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penaities,58 it also creates an independent civil action.59 Therefore, if 
found guilty of a violation, the landlord is liable for actual and con­
sequential damages, or three months rent, whichever is greater.60 
When section 14 was first enacted, portions of the statute, "fail­
ure to provide services" and "interference with quiet enjoyment" re­
quired intentional or willful conduct.61 When it was re-written, 
however, the words intentional and willful were deleted from the 
quiet enjoyment phrase.62 In interpreting this act of the legislature, 
the supreme judicial court has stated that specific intent63 was no 
longer required when a landlord had interfered with a tenant's quiet 
enjoyment, and that unsanitary conditions could cause harm regard­
less of whether or not the landlord had acted intentionally.64 Courts 
in Massachusetts have imposed liability upon the landlord "when­
ever the 'natural and probable consequence' of the landlord's action 
was [an] interruption of the tenant's rights."65 
There have only been three cases involving section 14 on ap­
peal,66 as most decisions of the housing courts have been left undis­
turbed. Those cases, which include Simon, are highly significant due 
to the interpretation given to section 14 by the supreme judicial 
court.67 
58. Id. The criminal penalties are imprisonment up to six months or a fine not to 
exceed $300 but not less than $25. Id. 
59. Id. The statute provides for civil liability to be imposed on those who violate 
its provisions. Id. The Simon court stated that a landlord need not be convicted for a 
criminal violation before a tenant could state a civil cause of action against the landlord 
because that would defeat the utility of the statute to the tenant who was attempting to 
enforce the provisions. 385 Mass. at 100,431 N.E.2d at 564. 
60. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 186, § 14 (West 1977 & Supp. 1983). This provi­
sion guarantees a minimum amount of damages to a successful tenant in the event that 
the actual damages suffered were minimal. If a tenant were to be only compensated for 
actual damages, and those damages were slight, the tenant might not litigate. The triple 
rent damage provision encourages landlords to comply with the statute. Simon, 385 
Mass. at Ill, 431 N.E.2d at 569; see infra notes 158-172 and accompanying text. 
61. Simon, 385 Mass. at 101,431 N.E.2d at 564 (citations omitted). 
62. Id. 
63. Id. at 101-102,431 N.E.2d at 564. 
64. Simon, 385 Mass. at 101,431 N.E.2d at 564. 
65. Id. at 102,431 N.E.2d at 565 (citing Blackett v. Olanoff, 371 Mass. 714, 358 
N.E.2d 817 (1977); Westland Hous. Corp. v. Scott, 312 Mass. 375, 44 N.E.2d 959 (1942); 
Shindler v. Milden, 282 Mass. 32, 184 N.E. 673 (1933». 
66. See Wolfberg v. Hunter, 385 Mass. 390, 432 N.E.2d 467 (1982); Simon v. Solo­
mon, 385 Mass. 91, 431 N.E.2d 556 (1982); Darmetko v. Boston Hous. Auth., 378 Mass. 
758, 393 N.E.2d 395 (1979). 
67. See infra notes 158-172 and accompanying text. 
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D. Simon 
1. Emotional Distress 
The Simon court was confronted with several issues, the first of 
which concerned whether Gem recklessly inflicted emotional distress 
upon Ms. Solomon. In applying the standard set forth in Agis,68 the 
court rejected Gem's argument that it was not the proximate cause of 
Ms. Solomon's injuries.69 Gem's argument that causation had not 
been established was based upon several facts. First, a plumber had 
examined the building's two waste stacks and plumbing system, and 
had found them to be in good repair and in compliance with the 
state plumbing regulations.70 Second, the source of the flooding was 
unclear, and although some back-ups did occur, uncontroverted tes­
timony indicated that the condition was caused by objects discarded 
by other tenants through the plumbing system or roof vents.7 1 Gem, 
therefore, asserted that it acted reasonably in its maintenance of the 
plumbing and was not responsible for the flooding that caused Ms. 
Solomon's injuries.72 
The court found, however, that Gem's arguments regarding the 
plumbing did not correctly state the scope of duty owed by Gem to 
its tenants.73 The court stated that it had firmly established that 
landlords renting residential dwellings guaranteed that the premises 
would be habitable,74 and that at the very least, this was a duty to 
keep the premises in compliance with state sanitary codes.75 More­
over, the court noted that there was evidence at trial which indicated 
that the wall between Ms. Solomon's apartment and the adjoining 
basement area was porous.76 Because Gem contemplated cementing 
the wall but did not do so, the court determined that a jury could 
reasonably find Gem's failure to cement was the proximate cause of 
68. See supra note 50. 
69. 385 Mass. at 95-96, 431 N.E.2d at 56!. 




72. Id. at 96, 431 N.E.2d at 56!. 
73. Id. One court has stated that the primary issue in emotional distress litigation 
is that of duty. "[DJuty ... is a legal conclusion which depends upon 'the sum total of 
those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is 
entitled to protection.'" Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii, 156, 170, 472 P.2d 509, 518 
(1970) (citing W. PROSSER, THE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 53, at 332 (3d ed. 
1964». 
74. 385 Mass. at 96, 431 N.E.2d at 561 (citing Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 
363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973». 
75. 385 Mass. at 96, 431 N.E.2d at 561 (citations omitted). 
76. Id. 
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Ms. Solomon's injuries.77 In addition, because the state sanitary 
code requires apartments to be water tight,78 the court stated that 
Gem incorrectly focused its causation argument on the relationship 
between its conduct and the flooding rather than on the relationship 
between the flooding and the injuries sustained.79 
Having found that Gem had violated its duty by failing to pre­
vent the flooding of Ms. Solomon's apartment, the court then stated 
that there was ample evidence to support the requisite elements80 in 
a cause of action for reckless or intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.81 Because testimony given at trial revealed that Ms. Solo­
mon continually complained of the flooding and that Gem sent a 
clean up crew each time, the court determined that a jury could find 
that Gem had notice.82 As a result, Gem knew, or should have 
known, that floods of sewage water would cause emotional distress.83 
The court stated further that because the flooding occurred numer­
ous times over an extended period, the jury was also justified in its 
finding of reckless conduct84 because the indifference displayed by 
Gem amounted to outrageous behavior.85 
77. Id. at 96-97, 431 N.E.2d at 562 (citations omitted). 
78. Id. at 97, 431 N.E.2d at 562 (citing MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. lOS, § 410.000 
(1978». 
79. 385 Mass. at 97 n.3, 431 N.E.2d at 562 n.3. 
80. See supra note 50. 
81. 385 Mass. at 97, 431 N.E.2d at 562. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 97, 431 N.E.2d at 562. 
84. The elements required in an intentional or reckless infliction of emotional dis­
tress as set forth in Agis, see supra note 50, is an adoption of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 46 (1977). Recklessness, as applied to Section 46, is defined as follows: 
The actor's conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of another if he does an 
act or intentionally fails to do an act which it is his duty to the other to do, 
knowing or having reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man 
to realize, not only that his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical 
harm to another, but also that such risk is substantially greater than that which 
is necessary to make his conduct negligent. 
Id. § 500. Section 500 states that there must be present a "conscious disregard or indif­
ference" to that risk. Id. at comment a. This definition of reckless applies to Section 46 
when the acts are in deliberate disregard of a high probability that emotional distress will 
occur. Id. § 46, at 77. 
85. 385 Mass. at 97, 431 N.E.2d at 562. Section 46 of the Restatement states that 
"[o)ne who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe 
emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if 
bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 46 (1977). Section 46 was adopted by Massachusetts courts in Agis. 371 
Mass. at 145, 355 N.E.2d at 319. Section 46 further states: 
It has not been enough that the defendant has acted with an intent which is 
tortious or even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict emotional distress or 
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Although the claim for intentional infliction of emotional dis­
tress against Gem was affirmed, Ms. Solomon appealed the summary 
judgment granted against her on her claim of negligent mainte­
nance.86 The court stated that it did not recognize a cause of action 
for negligent infliction of emotional distress without physical in­
jury.B1 It concluded that it need not decide that issue in Simon nor 
whether the legislature intended to authorize a claim for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress under section 14.88 Further, while the 
court also refused to decide whether the tenant could recover for 
emotional distress under a theory of strict liability,89 it noted that 
Ms. Solomon had not shown that she was entitled to additional re­
covery even if recovery under a lesser standard of culpability was 
available.90 
2. Section 14 and Damages 
Ms. Solomon invoked section 14 as a counterclaim to Gem's 
summary eviction proceeding.91 In interpreting section 14, the court 
rejected Gem's argument that a criminal conviction was necessary 
before a civil action was instituted,92 and that in a claim of interfer­
ence of quiet enjoyment, specific or malicious intent was unneces­
sary.93 Gem argued further that it had been found liable for the 
actions of third parties and that these actions were beyond its con­
tro1.94 This argument, similar to Gem's causation argument regard-
even that his conduct has been characterized by "malice" or a degree of aggra­
vation which would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, at comment d (1977). The comment states fur­
ther that liability should be found only when the conduct in question is "so outrageous in 
character, so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency and to be 
regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Id. 
86. 385 Mass. at 98, 431 N.E.2d at 562. 
87. Id. (citing Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, 381 Mass. 507, 413 N.E.2d 690 
(1980); Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978); McDonough v. 
Whalen, 365 Mass. 506, 313 N.E.2d 435 (1974); Spade v. Lynn & Boston Ry. Co., 168 
Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897». 
88. 385 Mass. at 98, 431 N.E.2d at 563. 
89. See infra notes 138-154 and accompanying text. 
90. 385 Mass. at 98, 431 N.E.2d at 563. Ms. Solomon argued that the warranty of 
habitability imposed strict liability upon landlords for the injuries caused when unsani­
tary conditions were present. Id. 
91. Id. at 94, 431 N.E.2d at 560. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text. 
92. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text. 
93. See 385 Mass. at 102, 431 N.E.2d at 564-65. 
94. I d. The actions of third parties claimed were related to Gem's reliance on the 
testimony that tenants had introduced foreign materials into waste stacks and had used 
washing machines in apartments. /d. at 103,431 N.E.2d at 565. 
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ing the issue of reckless infliction of emotional distress,95 was 
rejected on the basis of duty:96 the flooding could have been pre­
vented, and Gem had a duty to prevent it,97 
The court granted limited review on the issue of damages98 and 
affirmed all of the damages99 except the $10,000 award for breach of 
Ms. Solomon's quiet enjoyment, which was held to be redundant,loo 
The court stated that the primary cause of confusion leading to the 
redundancy arose from the jury instruction. lOl The trial judge below 
had instructed that for interference of quiet enjoyment, the jury was 
to consider the statutory awards provided under section 14. Addi­
tionally, for breach of warranty of habitability, the jury was in­
structed that damages may be awarded for the difference between 
the rent paid and the value of the premises in its inhabitable condi­
tion. 102 The jury was further instructed that lost income, medical 
expenses and pain and suffering were to be considered in assessing 
damages for reckless infliction of emotional distress. As a result of 
these instructions, the Simon court believed that, because the jury 
awarded damages under all three provisions, duplication of damages 
necessarily followed. 103 The court noted that if the jury had based 
the award for interference with quiet enjoyment upon actual damage 
suffered, then that award duplicated the damages granted for the lost 
rental value in the warranty of habitability as well as for the inflic­
tion of emotional distress. 104 The court, therefore, determined that 
the $10,000 award for breach of quiet enjoyment was not justified 
under section 14 because triple rent damages were to be awarded 
95. See supra text accompanying notes 70-77. 
96. See supra note 73; infra text accompanying note 114. 
97. 385 Mass. at 103,431 N.E.2d at 565 (citations omitted); see infra note 142 and 
accompanying text. 
98. 385 Mass. at 108, 431 N.E.2d at 568. The court limited its review of the dam­
ages awarded by the trial court to the issue of whether the award was supported by the 
evidence because Gem did not object at the time of the jury instruction. Since Gem filed 
timely motions for a directed verdict and for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, 
however, limited review was granted. ld. at 107-08, 431 N.E.2d at 568. 
99. See supra text accompanying notes 14-16. 
100. 385 Mass. at 108,431 N.E.2d at 568. 
101. Id. These damages were to be actual and consequential damages, or three 
months rent, whichever was greater. The judge instructed that actual and consequential 
damages should include rent that was paid over the value ofthe apartment, as well as lost 
income due to the injury sustained and damages for emotional distress. Id. at 109, 431 
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only when actual damages were less than the tripled rent. 105 
Additionally, the court affirmed the attorney fees awarded to 
Ms. Solomon in the amount of $40,000. 106 Gem argued that legal 
fees were granted to Ms. Solomon regarding her count of emotional 
distress, which was not part of her statutory claim.107 The court, 
however, dismissed this argument by stating that the delineation of 
claims did not affect the rights of the plaintiff and that the provision 
for actual and consequential damages suggested an intent by the leg­
islature to include all reasonable foreseeable damages. lOS Because it 
was found at trial that Gem knew or should have known that the 
floods would cause emotional harm and that Ms. Solomon's injuries 
were foreseeable, the emotional distress award was within the range 
of section 14 and was properly included in the consideration of attor­
ney fees. 109 The fees were found to be reasonable and the court ad­
ded that because judges are given broad discretion in such awards, 
their findings are not to be disturbed unless they are completely 
erroneous. I 10 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Emotional Distress 
There is no question that Ms. Solomon suffered severe emo­
tional distress as a result of Gem's actions. The straight-forward ap­
plication ofthe standard set forth inAgis-111 was proper, and the only 
serious contention raised was that of causation. I 12 The court's appli­
cation of a duty owed by a landlord to a tenant, which emphasized 
that causation was found between the flooding and Ms. Solomon's 
injuries rather than between the conduct of the landlord and the 
flooding, was proper in light of the theory of warranty of habitability 
and its purpose. I 13 If the court had allowed Gem's causation argu­
ment to prevail, it would have absolved Gem of all liability for the 
105. Id; see Darmetko v. Boston Hous. Auth., 378 Mass. 758, 393 N.E.2d 395 
(1979); see infra notes 161-162 and accompanying text. 
106. 385 Mass. at 113,431 N.E.2d at 570-71. 
107. Id. at 111,431 N.E.2d at 570. "A statutory fee award should not cover effort 
expended on independent claims that happen to be joined with statutory claims in a 
single proceeding." Id. (citing Hanner v. Classic Auto Body Inc., 1980 Mass. App. Adv. 
Sh. 1219,406 N.E.2d 686). 
108. 385 Mass; at 111-12, 431 N.E.2d at 570. 
109. Id. at 113,431 N.E.2d at 570-71. 
110. Id. (citations omitted). 

Ill. See supra note 50. 

112. See supra text accompanying notes 69-77. 
113. See supra text accompanying notes 74-75. 
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extensive suffering and injury of Ms. Solomon. Because duty is a 
legal conclusion,114 the Simon court essentially decided that, based 
upon policy considerations, Ms. Solomon was entitled to protection 
from Gem.lls Without such a duty imposed on landlords by the Si­
mon ruling, recalcitrant landlords might be encouraged to ignore 
problems in apartments if they are unable to ascertain the location of 
the problem. This would put tenants in the untenable position of 
knowing that, although wrongful conduct had been committed, there 
was no one at whom they could point a finger. In such a case, a 
tenant would be at his landlord's mercy, thereby defeating the pur­
pose of section 14.116 
While the court affirmed Ms. Solomon's claim for reckless in­
fliction of emotional distress, it refused to recognize a cause of action 
for negligent infliction of emotional distress without attendant physi­
cal injury.117 Several reasons for this denial were enunciated in Pay­
ton v. Abbott Laboratories .118 First, in a claim for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress, the emotional disturbance that is not 
so severe as to have physical impact is likely to be "so temporary, so 
evanescent and so relatively harmless" that allowing recovery would 
overburden both defendants and courts. I 19 Second, such claims are 
too easily imagined or faked when the guarantee of genuineness rep­
resented by physical injury is missing. Third, if the degree of culpa­
bility is mere negligence, the defendant should not be burdened by 
liability for emotional distress. 12o These reasons are very similar to 
justifications espoused as support for disallowing any type of dam­
ages for any emotional distress unaccompanied by physical injury. 121 
Other courts have disagreed that the claim of negligent inflic­
tion of emotional distress should be disallowed simply because there 
is no physical injury. The California Supreme Court, in Molien v. 
Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 122 stated that while courts wanted to 
114. See supra note 73. 
115. See w. PROSSER, supra note 40, § 53 at 325-26. 
116. See supra text accompanying note 54. 
117. 385 Mass. at 98, 431 N.E.2d at 562 (citing Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 
555, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978); McDonough v. Whalen, 365 Mass. 506, 313 N.E.2d 435 
(1974); Spade v. Lynn & Boston Ry. Co., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897». 
118. 386 Mass. 540, 552, 437 N.E.2d 171, 179 (1982). 
119. /d. 
120. /d. at 553, 437 N.E.2d at 179. 
121. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text. 
122. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813,167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980). In Molien, the plain­
tiff and his wife belonged to the Kaiser Health plan. When Mrs. Molien went in for a 
routine physical, the doctor informed her that she had syphilis. Mr. Molien was brought 
in for blood tests and Mrs. Molien was required to undergo treatment. Subsequently, it 
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avoid fictitious and fraudulent claims, drawing a line at negligence 
was not necessarily a justifiable rationale. 123 The Molien court be­
lieved that there were two major problems in allowing intentional 
and reckless infliction of emotional distress while disallowing a neg­
ligence claim. 124 First, such a distinction was overinclusive because 
it permitted recovery for emotional distress when there was physical 
injury regardless of whether that injury was minimal. Further, it 
was underinclusive because such a distinction systematically denied 
recovery to valid and genuine claims. Second, the requirement of 
physical injury itself resulted in encouraging "extravagant pleading 
and distorted testimony."125 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Utah 
stated 
[that] if the right to recover for injury resulting from the wrongful 
conduct could be defeated whenever such dangers [of fraud] exist, 
many of the grievances the law deals with would be eliminated. 
That some claims may be spurious should not compel those who 
administer justice to shut their eyes to serious wrongs and let them 
go without being brought to account. It is the function of Courts 
and juries to determine whether claims are valid or false. This 
responsibility should not be shunned merely because the task may 
be difficult to perform}26 
Hawaii in Rodrigues v. Slale, 127 also abrogated the physical in­
jury requirement. There, the Supreme Court of Hawaii stated that a 
general standard was needed for testing the validity of such 
claims.128 Factors to be considered in determining the genuineness 
of claims included the sophistication of medical testimony as well as 
was discovered that the doctor's diagnosis was in error. The plaintiff alleged as a result 
of the negligent diagnosis, his wife became upset, suspicious and the marriage broke 
down. Id. at 921, 616 P.2d at 815, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 833. 
123. Id. at 927, 616 P.2d at 819, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 837. 
124. Id. at 928, 616 P.2d at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838. 
125. /d. at 929, 616 P.2d at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838. 
126. Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 293, 358 P.2d 344, 347 (1961). 
127. 52 Hawaii, 156,472 P.2d 509 (1970). In Rodrigues, the plaintiffs were horne 
owners who resided on a lot separated from the highway by an unimproved parcel of 
land. A culvert ran under the highway emptying onto the parcel. The plaintiff informed 
the state that the culvert often clogged and during heavy rains water would build up on 
his land. The state highway department assured the plaintiff that everything would be 
fine and told the plaintiff to call if flooding looked imminent. One night, during a storm, 
the plaintiff called the state and warned that flooding looked certain. The state workers 
arrived five hours later by which time the home was flooded with six inches of water 
causing extensive damage to the plaintilfs house and furnishings. Id. at 159,472 P.2d at 
513. 
128. /d. at 172,472 P.2d at 519. 
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the quality and genuineness of the proof presented to the court.129 
Additionally, the ability of the court and the jury to see through dis­
honest claims, according to the Rodrigues court should be a consid­
eration. 130 The court further reasoned, "[ilt can no longer be said 
that the advantages gained by the courts in administering claims of 
mental distress by reference to narrow categories outweigh the bur­
den thereby imposed on the plaintiff."131 Rodrigues then adopted 
the standard that serious mental suffering would be recognized when 
a "reasonable man, normally constituted, would be unable to ade­
quately cope with the mental stress engendered by the circumstances 
of the case."132 
The foregoing reasoning should have been applied to the facts 
of Simon. It is unreasonable to presume that Ms. Solomon's injuries 
were lessened by the culpability of the defendant's conduct and there 
is no doubt that she had a valid claim. Additionally, Gem breached 
its duty whether it acted negligently or recklessly. The emotional 
distress suffered by Ms. Solomon was not increased by reckless con­
duct any more than it was decreased by negligent conduct. On the 
other hand, if there had been accompanying physical injury, such as 
a cut which had become infected, the court would have most likely 
allowed the cause of action. 133 In a case such as Ms. Solomon's, 
where there is a valid claim, a plaintiff must pray for a physical 
injury in order to recover for her genuine and valid negligently in­
flicted emotional harm. Moreover, requiring physical injury encour­
ages extravagant pleading and distorted testimony. In the 
hypothetical of the infected cut, much time and evidence would be 
lent in support of the physical injury in an attempt to justify the 
emotional distress. 134 Most courts have deleted foreseeability135 as 
the sole criteria in emotional distress cases,136 although some courts 
are still citing foreseeability and defendant's lesser degree of culpa­
bility as sufficient reasons for denying negligent infliction of emo­
tional distress.137 The real reason is fear of fraudulent and frivolous 
claims rather than the articulated justifications advanced. 
129. Id. at 172,472 P.2d at 519-20 (quoting Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 152 
N.E.2d 249, 176 N.Y.S.2d 966 (1958». 
130. 52 Hawaii at 172,472 P.2d at 520. 
131. /d. at 174, 472 P.2d at 520. 
132. Id. at 173,472 P.2d at 520. 
133. See Simon, 385 Mass. at 96, 431 N.E.2d at 562. 
134. See Mollen, 27 Cal. 3d at 929, 616 P.2d at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838. 
135. W. PROSSER, supra note 40, § 12, at 51. 
136. Payton, 386 Mass. at 553, 437 N.E.2d at 178. 
137. W. PROSSER, supra note 40, § 12, at 50. 
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B. Strict Liability-Warranty ofHabitability 
The question of whether a landlord could be held strictly liable 
for a breach of warranty of habitability was also addressed by the 
Simon court. Ms. Solomon argued that proof of negligence should 
not be necessary in the landlord-tenant relationship.138 The court 
stated initially that the warranty of habitability139 contemplated a 
minimum requirement that the landlord keep the dwelling in con­
formity with the state sanitary code. 140 The court did not hold that a 
landlord could be held strictly liable, but rather, it noted that a land­
lord could be held liable for the tenant's injuries at least when the 
landlord had not exercised reasonable care. 141 It is uncertain 
whether the court made the narrower statement because Gem's con­
duct had already been held to be reckless,142 or if it was because 
negligence was an element required to be proven. 
The rationale for adopting strict liability in the landlord-tenant 
context is based on several factors.143 The landlord has superior 
138. 385 Mass. at 98, 431 N.E.2d at 563; see supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
139. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text. 
140. 385 Mass. at 96, 431 N.E.2d at 561. 
141. Id. at 96, 431 N.E.2d at 562 (citing Crowell v. McCaffery, 377 Mass. 443, 450­
51,386 N.E.2d 1256, 1260 (1979» (emphasis added); see supra text accompanying notes 
74-75. 
142. 385 Mass. at 98, 431 N.E.2d at 562. In Berman & Sons, Inc. v. Jefferson, 379 
Mass. 196,200-01,396 N.E.2d 981, 984-85 (1979), the court declined to decide the ques­
tion of whether a finding of negligence was a necessary prerequisite for imposing liability 
upon a landlord for failure to maintain compliance with minimum housing standards. 
/d. (citing Crowell v. McCaffery, 377 Mass. 443, 386 N.E.2d 1256 (1979». In Berman, 
the landlord argued that to impose strict liability would penalize a landlord who acted 
reasonably and would create a hopeless duty especially since neither the landlord nor the 
tenant expected perfect upkeep when there were system breakdowns and time needed for 
repairs. Therefore, the landlord argued that the law should correspond to reality. 379 
Mass. at 199-200,396 N.E.2d at 984. The court responded by stating that "[a] tenant has 
a right to expect that the landlord will comply with the law. It is this right we protect." 
Id. at 199-200 n.6, 396 N.E.2d at 984 n.6. The court further stated that "[c]onsiderations 
of fault do not belong in an analysis of warranty." Id. at 200, 396 N.E.2d at 984. 
Berman, therefore, indicates that the court is willing to view a strict liability imposi­
tion favorably. Commentators have suggested that there are a number of reasons why an 
imposition of strict liability in the landlord-tenant context is valid. 
The adoption of the implied warranty of habitability was premised in large part 
on product liability and analogies. If a lease is a contract to provide goods and 
services, these same products liability precedents suggest that a landlord (like a 
builder-vendor of real property, seller of used property, provider of commercial 
services, or lessor of personal property) should be held strictly liable for per­
sonal injury or property damage caused by a defect in the premises. 
Love, Landlord's Liability lor Difective Premises: Caveat Lessee, Negligence or Strict Lia­
bility, 1975 WIS. L. REV. 19, 160. 
143. Id. at 155. 
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knowledge and is in a better position to prevent defects. Also, the 
landlord is in a better position to bear and distribute losses through 
liability insurance, thus spreading the ultimate cost on to all tenants. 
Finally, a strict liability standard eliminates the need for proving 
negligence, an important factor since it may be impossible for the 
tenant to prove that the landlord knew or should have known about 
the defect. 144 
There are also those who strenuously advance reasons for deny­
ing the imposition of strict liability on landlords. 145 First, it has been 
asserted that an apartment has several rooms with many facilities, 
thus making it difficult to ascertain who is responsible for the defect 
or its source. 146 Many jurisdictions, however, imply a warranty in 
new homes on the builder-vendor of real property despite the com­
plexity of the product. 147 In fact, it is "this very complexity that has 
justified the imposition of strict liability because it is impossible for 
the average purchaser to detect even dangerous defects in construc­
tion."148 A second criticism is that an apartment is subject to con­
stant use and deterioration and is therefore "used" property.149 Still, 
the landlord is in a better position to inspect for defects and deter­
mine a need for repair. An additional consideration is the fact that 
courts have been willing to hold sellers of used property strictly lia­
ble. 150 A third reason for denying the imposition of strict liability 
upon landlords is that the lease is an agreement to provide services 
and therefore the theory of strict liability is inapplicable. 151 The serv­
ices of the landlord, however, are more commercial than profes­
sional in nature, and therefore, such an immunity to strict liability 
should not apply.152 A final rationale is that a lease is not a sale, but 
most jurisdictions have not made a distinction between sellers and 
non-sellers of personal property. 153 Like a retailer or manufacturer, 
the landlord places his product, the apartment, in "the stream of 
commerce." Moreover, because he controls the length of the lease, a 
landlord can prevent the circulation of a defective product. 154 
144. fd. 
145. fd. at 156. 
146. fd. at 137. 
147. fd. at 137 n.674. 
148. fd. at 138. 
149. fd. 
150. fd. at 138-39 n.680. 
151. fd. at 139 n.683. 
152. /d. at 140. 
153. fd. 
154. fd. at 142. 
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As the foregoing discussion indicates, the reasons advanced for 
the imposition of strict liability upon landlords are more persuasive 
than those advanced for not establishing such a liability. Despite the 
logic of imposing strict liability, the Massachusetts courts have de­
clined to do so. 
C. f)amages 
Ms. Solomon's award of $10,000 for interference with quiet en­
joyment was vacated on the basis of redundancy. 155 Although this 
resulted in part from the confusing instructions issued by the trial 
judge to the jury,156 it is clear that the court's interpretation of sec­
tion 14 was also important in this determination. 157 
In interpreting damages recoverable under section 14, the court 
relied heavily upon f)armetko v. Boston Housing Authority.15s In 
f)armetko, the lower housing court had applied the triple rent clause 
of section 14 in awarding damages for a leaking roof. 159 The housing 
court awarded three times the monthly rent for each month the roof 
had remained unrepaired. 160 In reviewing the interpretation of sec­
tion 14, the f)armetko court stated that section 14 provided for actual 
and consequential damages or three months rent, and that there was 
no indication of legislative intent that each month in which a viola­
tion occurred should be considered separately. 161 This conclusion 
severely limited damages awarded under the statute as well as less­
ened the punitive aspects to the landlord. 162 The Simon court's read­
ing of section 14, however, further limited the damages recoverable 
under that section. In holding that a tenant could receive only one 
award of triple rent regardless of the number of violations,163 the 
court stated that the triple rent damage provision was an incentive to 
tenants to seek damages. 164 Once such an award had been granted, 
155. See supra notes 98-105 and accompanying text. 
156. Id. 
157. 385 Mass. at 110-11, 431 N.E.2d at 569. 
158. 378 Mass. 758, 393 N.E.2d 395 (1979). In Darmetko, the tenant claimed that 
defects existed in the kitchen and living room floors, in addition to the fact that the roof 
leaked, bringing water into the closet and the living room. Id. at 759, 393 N.E.2d at 397. 
159. Id. at 760, 393 N.E.2d at 397. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. at 762, 393 N.E.2d at 398 (emphasis added). 
162. In Darmetko, the damage award by the housing court was three times the 
monthly rent for each month the roof remained unrepaired for a total of $5,358. Under 
the supreme judicial court's interpretation of section 14, the damages were reduced to 
$141. Id. at 761-62, 393 N.E.2d at 398. 
163. 385 Mass. at 110,431 N.E.2d at 569. 
164. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
189 1983) LANDLORDS, TENANTS, AND DAMAGES 
that incentive had been fulfilled. 165 The court too quickly dismissed 
Ms. Solomon's argument that such a restrictive reading would effec­
tively immunize landlords from future violations. The court rea­
soned that a tenant could institute another proceeding if a new 
violation arose after the initial suit. 166 A hypothetical will illustrate 
the difficult situation the court has created by its rulings in Darmetko 
and Simon. 
A, a tenant, pays $100 per month in rent. At the beginning of 
month one, the roof begins to leak (violation one). At the end of the 
same month, the electricity is turned off (violation twO).167 These 
remain unrepaired for three months. Prior to the Darmetko holding, 
the successful litigating tenant could have potentially recovered 
$1800,168 but because of Darmetko, the tenant's potential award is 
reduced to $600. 169 With the further limitation of Simon, which per­
mits only one triple rent damage award per suit, regardless of the 
number of violations, if the tenant institutes a proceeding at the end 
of the third month, the potential award is only $300,170 If the tenant, 
however, instituted proceedings for the violation of the leaking roof 
before the electricity shut-off occurred, the tenant could institute a 
second proceeding against the landlord for the second violation and 
receive $600.171 
As indicated by this hypothetical, the court has essentially 
placed the burden on the plaintiff-tenant to institute proceedings in a 
timely fashion as well as encouraged litigation rather than settle­
ment. In addition, once there is a violation, a landlord who knows 
that there are minimal actual damages, is assured of a maximum 
165. 385 Mass. at 110,431 N.E.2d at 569. 
166. ld. at 111, 431 N.E.2d at 569. 
167. For purposes of the hypothetical, assume both examples are violations and 
both are resulting from the fault of the landlord. 
168. Before Darmetko, the tenant could recover for both violations. For the first 
violation (the leaking roof), the calculation would be as follows: three times the monthly 
rent of $100 ($300) multiplied by each month unrepaired (3) equals the appropriate 
award ($900). The second violation, the electrical shut-off, would be calculated in the 
same manner for another $900, yielding a total of $1800. 
169. The Darmetko court stated that each month the violation occurred or contin­
ued should not be treated separately. 378 Mass. at 762, 393 N.E.2d at 398. Therefore, 
the first violation would be calculated as follows: three times the monthly rent of $100, 
which equals $300. The second violation would be calculated in the same manner for a 
total of $600. 
170. The Simon court held that the triple rent clause was to be used only in cases 
where the actual damages were less than three months rent. Additionally, the violations 
were not to be considered separately. 385 Mass. at 109-11, 431 N.E.2d at 569. As a 
result, the damages would total $300. 
171. See supra t~xt accompanying note 166. 
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award to the tenant of only three months rent regardless of the 
number of violations that he commits. This anomalous result also 
will be difficult for the housing courts, because if a new violation 
occurs after the initial suit is filed, the tenant may institute a second 
proceeding.172 Thus, it is possible that a tenant could have two or 
more related actions in process at the same time. This will burden 
the tenant, the landlord and the court. If the two actions are consoli­
dated, the $imon court's ruling appears to limit the tenant to a total 
possible award of three months rent and immunize the recalcitrant 
landlord. Thus, the Simon court's interpretation and application of 
the damage award under section 14 has emasculated the use of that 
section for tenants claiming minimal damages and permits immuni­
zation for irresponsible landlords. Such a result is inconsistent with 
the purpose of the statute which was to ensure decent housing and to 
protect tenants. 173 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In Simon v. S%mon,174 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court was requested to decide questions involving the warranty of 
habitability, the tort claim of emotional distress and the interpreta­
tion of Chapter 186, Section 14 of the Massachusetts General 
Laws. 175 
The Simon court affirmed damages for breach of warranty of 
habitability, stating that in Massachusetts it was firmly established 
that landlords renting residential dwellings guaranteed that the 
premises would be habitable. Further, at the very least, this was a 
duty to keep the premises in compliance with state sanitary codes. 
The court declined to decide the question of whether strict lia­
bility was applicable in a landlord violation of warranty of habitabil­
ity. Although the court has yet to decide this issue specifically, 
contemplating a minimum requirement that the dwelling be habita­
ble indicates the court's willingness to do so favorably. The justifica­
tions advanced for strict liability are compelling since the landlord 
has superior knowledge, is in a better position to bear the loss, and is 
making a profit from the renting venture. Although a strict liability 
theory is not fully analogous because a lease is not a sale, the land­
172. 385 Mass. at Ill, 431 N.E.2d at 569. 
173. See supra notes 52-65 and accompanying text. 
174. 385 Mass. 91, 431 N.E.2d 566 (1982). 
175. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 186, § 14 (West 1977 & Supp. 1983). 
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lord controls his "product", the apartment, and it is he who puts the 
product into the stream of commerce. 
In affirming Ms. Solomon's emotional distress damages, the 
court found that the landlord acted recklessly with extreme and out­
rageous behavior, that these actions caused the injuries, and that the 
injuries were severe. The court, however, affirmed the dismissal of 
Ms. Solomon's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress 
stating that the Massachusetts courts have not recognized such a 
cause of action unless accompanied by physical injury. In rational­
izing this position, the supreme judicial court has stated that in a 
negligent infliction of emotional distress claim without physical in­
jury, such emotional harm is likely to be so temporary and relatively 
harmless that allowing recovery would burden defendants and 
courts. The court has expressed concern that such claims would be 
too easily imagined, and the lack of physical injury takes away the 
guarantee of genuineness that the court desired. Finally, the court 
did not believe that the degree of the defendant's culpability in a 
negligence case warranted imposing a liability for possible emotional 
harm. Notwithstanding the policy concerns advanced by the court, 
Ms. Solomon's injuries were severe whether as a result of negligent 
or reckless conduct. The fear of fraudulent claims is not a valid rea­
son for denying recovery: the court should take the responsibility of 
determining the validity of a claim and not merely close its eyes to 
the problem. 
The Simon court also interpreted Chapter 186, Section 14 and 
stated that its purpose was to ensure decent housing and to protect 
tenants. In its interpretation, however, the court held that only one 
recovery of the triple rent clause was available in a proceeding. The 
court's interpretation of section 14 in both Simon and Darmetko has 
essentially emasculated the use of the statute to tenants who claim 
only minimal damages. In addition, this interpretation has effec­
tively immunized irresponsible landlords. 
Simon represents part of a growing trend that is holding land­
lords liable for tenants' injuries-both physical and emotional. De­
spite this, the limitations placed upon tenant recovery under section 
14, indicates the court's concern with maintaining some balance in 
the landlord-tenant relationship. 
Melinda Wilkins Hunkins 
